

The Case against Evaluative Realism^{*}

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ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.

Key words: evaluative realism, flexibility, metaethics, internalism, causal efficacy.

In this paper I want to present a case against evaluative realism. The considerations I will submit will not constitute a refutation of it, given that in the central points they dwell on intuitions that, if sound, would support rejecting realism quite directly, with the result that as arguments they might be accused of begging the question. For better or for worse, I think that no stronger case against (nor for) evaluative realism is forthcoming. But this does not make the considerations worthless, I hope, for they make explicit some of the consequences of the realist approach. To the extent to which one regards them as counterintuitive, the considerations may eventually make one revise one's judgments about what one took to be one's own relevant intuitions.

The paper is divided into six sections. In the first section I focus on the target: taking some earlier work of mine as my starting-point, I propose to characterize evaluative realism as rejecting what I call the flexibility of values, in contrast to other proposals that make evaluative realism either too easy or too hard. In the second section I present the particular flexible account of values I would favor, which is mainly due to David Lewis, and the scenarios whose intuitive description (I take it) strongly favor this flexibility, which are variants of the "Moral Twin Earth" submitted to related aims by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons. People quite often claim, nonetheless, that

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they do not share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions. The two main considerations I will offer aim to urge them to revise what they take to be their own intuitions. In section three I will claim that evaluative realism, including the dispositional variety of it, cannot account for internalism about values. In section four I will also consider the somewhat trickier case of internalism about value-judgments. In section five I will present the Missing Explanation Argument, due to Mark Johnston, to the effect that flexible properties cannot be involved in causally explaining general dispositions of subjects to respond in certain ways, and I will claim that evaluative properties intuitively do not appear in such explanations. And finally in section six I will consider why, on the face of it, this is compatible with the views about so-called moral explanations of philosophers like Nicholas Sturgeon.

1. Evaluative Realism vs. the Flexibility of Values

The diversity of views intended under the label of “realism” is in my view particularly acute with regard to realism about evaluative properties. Before presenting the one I will use, I want to briefly mention some alternatives that, in my view, make evaluative realism either too easy or too hard.

Consider for instance what is offered by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord:

Realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) that claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism), and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more. (1988b, p. 5)

I think it should be clear that realism so conceived will be a quite uncontroversial position. To illustrate, consider a caricature-like subjectivist account of values, having it that something like the following defines being good:

x is good iff we value x .

False as it might be for other reasons, the proposal does satisfy (1) and (2) and hence would be a realist proposal conceived in this way. But if this counts as realist, almost any possible view would as well.¹ Adding an epistemic element of the sort

It is possible to find out about some moral sentences that they are true. (Thomson 1998a, p. 171)

does not seem to change the situation, since on occasions we can clearly find out what we value.

So it seems that one might have a non-realist approach to evaluative properties that respects that instantiations of them make simple predications of predicates signifying them straightforwardly, and sometimes knowably, true. On the other side, and, I

¹ I don't mean to suggest that Sayre-McCord is unaware of this, quite the contrary: he explicitly considers various possible “subjectivist” positions as varieties of realism, see (Sayre-McCord 1988b, pp. 16-9). It is only in this “cheap” sense, I take it, that Lewis himself describes his position as a realist one: values as he conceives them “do exist”, see (Lewis 1989, p. 93). For a similar view, consider Jackson: “*Realists* [are] cognitivists [who have it that the statements in question are semantically truth-apt] who take the extra step of holding that the ethical properties are instantiated” (Jackson 1998, p. 128).

take it, motivated by considerations like those just submitted, David Brink says the following:

A moral realist thinks that moral claims should be construed literally; there are moral facts and true moral propositions. Ethics is objective, then, insofar as it concerns matters of fact and insofar as moral claims can be true or false (and some of them are true). But moral realism claims that ethics is objective in another sense, which is not always distinguished, from this first kind of objectivity. Not only does ethics concern matter of fact, it concerns facts that hold independently of anyone's belief about what is right or wrong. This first kind of objectivity distinguishes moral realist and other cognitivist theories from nihilism and noncognitivism; the second kind of objectivity distinguishes moral realism from constructivist version of cognitivism. (1989, p. 20)

As this is worded, though, it might seem that it also allows our caricature-like subjectivist above to count as a realist, as according to her the relevant responses on which goodness depends were not anyone's "belief about what is right or wrong" but rather a given conative attitude: *valuing*. But let us interpret Brink more liberally, as holding that evaluative realism requires that evaluative properties have essences that are independent of relevant subjective mental responses, regardless of whether they are doxastic or not. So understood, it would certainly exclude our subjectivist. But the problem now is that arguably it would exclude too much. There is a sense in which dispositions have natures that are not independent on their manifestations: dispositions can be possessed when the manifestation does not occur, to be sure, but their relation to them is part of their essences, of what makes them the properties they are.² Take, for instance, dispositionalism about colors. According to the view, colors are dispositions to produce in certain subjects, say, normal human perceivers as they actually are, certain mental responses, say, the experience of a certain color being instantiated, under certain conditions, say, normal viewing conditions as they actually are. Hence colors have natures that involve mental responses. This, one may say, makes a difference with respect to the alternative so-called *primary view* about colors: according to dispositionalism colors are less than fully objective properties, but this is not so according to the primary view. But both views arguably are, and are certainly taken to be, varieties of *realism* about colors. *Mutatis mutandis*, one should expect, for the case of values: a view according to which values are fully objective properties, whose natures are independent of any mental subjective response, should certainly count as a form of evaluative realism. I will refer to such a view as (*evaluative*) *objectivism*. But realism should not require objectivism by definition.

It is worth noticing that arguably both for primary, fully objective properties, and for secondary, real but dispositional, properties, broadly conceived Fregean considerations require that there should be some descriptive material that fixes that they are signified by certain expressions and concepts. And in the case of colors, they arguably involve precisely the relevant chromatic subjective responses. For reasons that are familiar from Kripke (1980), this suffices for the following to be not only true but also *a priori*

² See Fine (1994) for an elaboration of the view on essences I am relying on here, and García-Carpintero (2002) for the application to the distinction dispositional vs. categorical.

x is red iff x is disposed to produce in normal human perceivers an experience as of red in normal viewing conditions

even if only contingently true. According to these realist views about colors, you only get something that holds *necessarily* by rigidifying on the relevant expressions, as in

x is red iff x is disposed to produce in normal human perceivers *as they actually are* an experience as of red in normal viewing conditions *as they actually are*.

That is something that both “primarists” and dispositionalists can, and do, hold. As suggested, the difference between them seems to lie in whether they hold that the former holds *in virtue of the nature of the color* or not, see García-Carpintero (2002) and Wedgwood (1998) —and in my view, to settle this question, *a posteriori* considerations provided by the specialist are required.

I think that something like this is precisely characteristic of *realism* about colors, and this is what I propose to generalize. Let me say then that if **F** is a property, an *rd biconditional* for (a predicate signifying) it is a substantial biconditional of the form:

x is *f* iff x has the disposition to produce in subjects *S* the mental response *R* under conditions *C*

or the form

x is *f* iff subjects *S* have the disposition to issue the x -directed mental response *R* under conditions *C*

where ‘is *f*’ signifies **F**, and ‘substantial’ is there to avoid “whatever-it-takes” specifications of either *S*, *R* or *C*.³

Let me also say that a specification of the subjects in an *rd* biconditional is *rigid* iff the relevant predicate involved in the specification is rigid,⁴ and *flexible* otherwise. Take for instance ‘normal human perceiver.’ This is not, as it stands, a rigid specification. For take the relevant predicate ‘is a normal human perceiver’ and suppose that in the actual world, it is true (even if knowable only *a posteriori*) that being such is being a

³ One such “whatever-it-takes” specification of, say, subjects *S* would be “those subjects, however they be, such that something is disposed to produce in them responses *R* under conditions *C* iff it is **F**.” *Mutatis mutandis* for the responses and the conditions.

⁴ I am assuming, with Kripke (1980), and a lot of people in discussions on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science or metaethics, that the notion of rigidity might be extended to be applicable to predicates, roughly along the lines of: a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property in all relevant worlds. Proposals like this have recently received criticisms, among which: that it would trivialize, making *all* predicates trivially rigid (see for instance Soames 2002), and that in any case it would over-generalize, counting as rigid predicates some that do not signify natural properties/kinds (see for instance Schwartz 2002). I try to respond to these criticisms, respectively, in my unpublished ‘Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem’ and ‘The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the “Unnatural.”’ In the latter I also argue that the relevant simple predicates like those that will concern us here, ‘is red,’ ‘is funny,’ ‘is good’ and the like are, nonetheless, rigid. Given this I will speak of them *signifying properties*, without relativizing such talk to worlds.

human with a perceptual apparatus meeting condition *ABC*. Now consider a counterfactual situation in which, for whatever reason you might think of, the human perceivers that are *normal there* are those with a perceptual apparatus meeting the different condition *DEF*. Now intuitively, it is this other property of being a human with a perceptual apparatus meeting condition *DEF* which would be relevant for evaluating sentences containing ‘is a normal human perceiver’ with respect to this other world. But then ‘is a normal human perceiver’ is not a rigid predicate, but a flexible one. Its relevant rigidification, which can be put as something like ‘is a normal human perceiver *as they actually are*’ leads nonetheless to a rigid specification of the subjects, of the sort ‘normal human perceivers *as they actually are*.’

An rd biconditional is *rigid* iff it involves a rigid specification of the subjects, and is *flexible* otherwise. Finally, a given property is *flexible* iff there is a flexible rd biconditional for (a predicate signifying) it which holds (*a priori* and) in virtue of its nature and hence necessarily.⁵

With all these stipulations I can state my proposal about realism thus:

A property is *real* iff it is not a flexible property.

What considerations would be relevant for the issue as to whether a given predicate signifies a real vs. a flexible property?

Suppose that ‘is *f*’ signifies⁶ property **F**, and suppose that *S* and *C* are the relevant flexible specifications of subjects and conditions, and *S*_@ and *C*_@ their relevant rigidifications, and that the only relevant rd biconditionals are

(R) *x* is *f* iff *x* is disposed to produce in *S*_@ the response *R* under conditions *C*_@.

(F) *x* is *f* iff *x* is disposed to produce in *S* the response *R* under conditions *C*.

Both are, we may suppose, true with respect to the actual world and, we may also suppose, *a priori* knowably so. But the following asymmetry arises; abstracting now from issues about essence vs. necessity, their metaphysical status covaries with the nature of **F** as stated in

F is real iff (R) is necessary iff (F) is contingent

F is flexible iff (R) is contingent iff (F) is necessary.

This provides a way of testing whether ‘is *f*’ signifies a real or a flexible property, and based just on *a priori* considerations. The recipe is, very abstractly put, this: consider what could be a counterexample of the necessity of the relevant statement on the assumption that the predicate signifies one particular kind of property. I will refer to them as *target situations*. Then check how these should be intuitively described (with respect to the relevant predicate) and conclude accordingly.

⁵ This is the notion labeled *flexible response-dependence* in López de Sa (2003). I am abstracting here from issues related to response-dependence.

⁶ See footnote 4 above.

I will instantiate this sort of relevant consideration in the next section. But let me end this one with the following remark about words. The question of the appropriateness of labels *per se*, when philosophical terms are at issue, does not appear to be particularly interesting philosophically, *once* the relevant distinctions are clear and attended to. There certainly seems to be a contrast between entirely objective properties and dispositional properties, *on the one side*, and flexible properties, *on the other*, as issued in the question of how the relevant target situations should be intuitively described. My aim here is to present a case against the view that evaluative properties are *of the former kind*, whatever they are called. As I said, though, I will call them *real properties*.

2. A Flexible Lewisian Theory of Values and the Intuitions about Evaluative Twin Earth

That some evaluative properties are intuitively flexible is, I take it, quite uncontroversial. Consider the case of 'is funny.' Suppose that the following are the relevant flexible and rigidified biconditionals

x is funny iff x is disposed to amuse us under appropriately attentive conditions.

x is funny iff x is disposed to amuse us as we actually are under appropriately attentive conditions as they actually are.

Now take something funny, even something, as I am ready and willing to grant, *really really* funny, like *The Simpsons*. Gerald Lang suggests that we would not take very seriously the suggestion that it "would continue to be funny even if a comprehensive alteration in our comic sensibilities took place" (Lang 2001, p. 201). That is, in a very compressed form, an instance of the relevant consideration we have just considered, to the effect that being funny is flexible and not real. As there is no doubt that *The Simpsons* is actually funny, there is no doubt that it is disposed to amuse us as we actually are under appropriately attentive conditions as they actually are. Consider now a relevant counterfactual target situation, w , in which this alteration of our sensibilities takes place, but which, apart from this, resembles the actual world as much as possible. *The Simpsons* is *not* disposed to amuse us *as we would be in w* under appropriate attentive conditions *as they would be in w* .

So far we have the relevant target situation, appropriately neutrally described, as no hypothesis about the extension of 'is funny' *with respect to w* is introduced. Hence, that it is a possibility is something agreeable by *both* defenders of the view that 'is funny' signifies a real property and defenders of the view that it signifies a flexible one. The crucial question is now: how should it be intuitively described with respect to 'is funny'? In particular, is it true or false, intuitively, that '*The Simpsons* is funny' *when evaluated with respect to w* ? Lang says that we would not even take seriously the suggestion that it might be true. But now, if '*The Simpsons* is funny' is false with respect to w and '*The Simpsons* is disposed to amuse us as we actually are under appropriately attentive conditions, as they actually are' is true with respect to w , the rigidified biconditional is only contingently true with respect to the actual world. Hence, 'is funny' signifies a flexible property, and not a real one.

One might say: “But we do say, at least sometimes, that *The Simpsons* is funny, in the objective mood, as it were, rather than *we find them funny*. Furthermore, we say those things even acknowledging that they may not amuse some people, for after all some days, although funny, they don’t even amuse us. Why couldn’t we say then that *The Simpsons* are really funny even in the target situation, only that those unlucky people fail to be disposed to be amused by them?” The straight answer is that we *could* definitely say this: it’s only that intuitively we, or at least most of us, don’t want to. Remember that the crucial issue is how a given target situation should be *intuitively described*. In the submitted consideration, there is also another important element which is worth stressing to avoid possible misunderstandings. The fact that we have simple predicates like ‘is funny’ signifying the property of being funny arguably entails that there should be a “real”/appearance distinction concerning what is funny, that being funny should be distinct from seeming funny or actually amusing. But that of course is also the case *even if funny is a flexible property*, and hence in particular does not entail anything about what the proper intuitive description of target situations should be. There are things which seem funny even though they are not really funny at all (see (Wright 1992, p. 101) for a dozen examples of this) and conversely, as submitted, *The Simpsons* are funny even if they sometimes fail to seem so. But that is indeed entailed by the use of the *dispositional* idiom in the rd biconditionals. Dispositions can be possessed without issuing their characteristic manifestations. And conversely, their manifestation could occur without being the manifestation of a possessed disposition. Flexible properties are not dispositions, true enough. But with respect to each world, the things that have a given flexible property in this world are those that are disposed to produce the relevant response in the subjects as they are in that world under the conditions as they are in that world. Hence, in each world, having the property, being funny, is not the same as issuing the relevant response, seeming funny.

The same situation occurs, I claim, for a number of similar *soft* evaluative predicates: ‘is tasty’, ‘is disgusting’, ‘is comfortable’, not to mention ‘is sexy,’ ‘is fashionable’, or ‘is cool.’ With respect to any of these, it seems, hardly anyone would claim to have the intuitions supporting their signifying real properties. Does it generalize with respect to *all* evaluative predicates, including the *hard* cases of moral and some aesthetic predicates? Consider the following general rd biconditional, adapted from the proposal by David Lewis in his ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’ (1989):

x is good iff we are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective conditions.

Some remarks are in order. First, *valuing* is the favorable attitude of desiring to desire. That valuing is a desiderative rather than a doxastic attitude is arguably entailed by its being a *favorable* attitude. But “first order” desiring would certainly *not* do: we, unfortunately quite often, desire things we do not value at all. Weakness of will is, of course, a case at hand. Take “unwilling smokers,” as one might call them, like myself. I desire to smoke a *Ducados* quite often, I actually *love* smoking. But I find some uneasiness even in *reporting* it as I have just done. It is not, or at least not only, that I have a contrasting desire *not to* smoke: that would be a case of conflicting desires —which by the way

could eventually issue in conflicting valuing or even in moral dilemmas. But phenomenologically, my case of smoking is not, or at least is not only, constituted by what I experience when for instance I have contrasting desires about enjoying a good film this afternoon or remaining in my office finishing this paper. In this case I do not want to be rid of either desire: I would prefer the world to be so that they could both be satisfied, but unfortunately I will have to act upon only one of them. My smoking is different: I *do* want to be rid of my desirings to smoke: even if I desire to smoke, I desire not to desire to smoke at all. So that, when I light I cigarette, I'd say that my will is weak, given that I desire not to have the desire that makes me do so. So failing to desire as one values is failing to desire as one desires to desire. Hence, it seems, valuing is desiring to desire.⁷

Second, *we* are, according to the proposal, those that are disposed to value, with respect to the relevant particular issue at stake, exactly like the speaker. It is important to stress that, so understood, 'we' turns out to be a *flexible* characterization of a group of subjects. The relevant predicate signifies with respect to the actual world the property of being relevantly the way I am *actually*. But I could be otherwise, and in particular my disposition to value could be very different from what it actually is. But then, with respect to those worlds in which I am suitably different, it will signify the property of being relevantly the way I *would be* in those situations.

Third and finally, *appropriate reflective conditions* are rather schematic. In Lewis' original paper, he submits that the relevant conditions are the conditions of fullest possible imaginative acquaintance with the thing in question, *possible* for the subjects in question and relatively to the thing in question (Lewis 1989, pp. 77-9). This element has met with some resistance in the literature (see for instance Johnston (1989) and Smith (1994)). Some would claim that further elements should be included, notably awareness of all (non-evaluative) relevant facts. I tend to agree with Lewis that this further element, crucial for the question of *balancing* different probably conflicting values, should not be included in the conditions determining the values to be balanced in the first place (see Lewis 1989, pp. 79-82). But the issue is delicate, and I would rather not go into it here. My proposal is then to characterize the relevant conditions as *the appropriately reflective conditions*, having in mind these Lewisian conditions of fullest possible imaginative acquaintance, but perhaps also some others like the ones considered if further thought renders them appropriate.

Let me come back to the issue at hand. It would seem that if 'is good' signifies a flexible property then arguably all evaluative predicates do so as well.⁸ Does it? As we

⁷ In the meantime, and fortunately, I quit. For further discussion of the objections against the sufficiency of desiring to desire for valuing, and of its necessity, see my unpublished 'What is Valuing?', where I try to show how the Lewisian proposal should be properly understood, or otherwise amended: valuing is desired desiring, or perhaps merely desiring one does not desire against.

⁸ This is straightforward if one characterizes, as I am inclined to do, *evaluative* predicates as those that suffice for 'is good' (or 'is bad'). One should expect the claim also to hold, I imagine, in some alternative formulation is adopted.

have seen, settling this depends on the status of the relevant flexible and rigid biconditionals

x is good iff we are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective conditions.

x is good iff we, as we actually are, are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective conditions, as they actually are.

which in turn depends on what turns out to be the intuitively proper description of suitably neutrally described counterfactual target situations. I claim that one of these is the generalized version of the Moral Twin Earth submitted in related contexts and for related aims by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons,⁹ which I will call *Evaluative Twin Earth* or *ETE* for short.

Take something that I am—and hence *we* are—*actually* disposed to value under appropriate reflective conditions: (say) Santi's lying to me on some particular occasion. We, as we actually are, are disposed to value Santi's lying to me under appropriate reflective conditions, as they actually are, and hence it is—actually—good. But I could be different. In particular my dispositions to value this particular lie under those relevant conditions could be suitably more “deontologist,” as it were. I could be such that I am not disposed to value it under appropriate reflective conditions. So let us consider a situation in which I *am* like that, but agrees with the actual situation in as much as it's possible compatibly with this difference, and call it ETE. We, as we are in ETE, are not disposed to value Santi's lying to me under appropriate reflective conditions.

So far, again, we have the relevant target situation, appropriately neutrally described, as no hypothesis about the extension of ‘is good’ *with respect to ETE* is introduced. Hence, that it is a possibility is something agreeable by *both* defenders of the view that ‘is good’ signifies a real property and defenders of the view that it signifies a flexible one.¹⁰ The crucial question is again: how should it be intuitively described with respect to ‘is good’? In particular, is it true or false, intuitively, ‘Santi's lying to me is good’ *when evaluated with respect to ETE*? My own intuitions, and as I understand him, Lewis' also, are that it should be *false* with respect to ETE. But then, if ‘Santi's lying to me is good’ is false with respect to *ETE* and ‘We, as we actually are, are disposed to value Santi's lying to me under appropriate reflective conditions, as they actually are’ is true with respect to *ETE*, the rigidified biconditional is only contingently true with respect to the actual world. Hence, ‘is good’ signifies a flexible property, and not a real one. Hence, arguably all evaluative predicates, and not only soft ones, do so as well:

⁹ See Horgan & Timmons (1991), (1992a), (1992b), (1996) & (2000a). Their own positive views might differ from mine, though. For their views see *inter alia* Horgan & Timmons (2000b).

¹⁰ It is worth emphasizing that the availability of the Evaluate Twin Earth *per se* merely depends the relevant psychological facts being contingent and hence that it is a possibility is something that all the disputants have reason to accept. As we are about to see, how is it to be intuitively described in terms of the predicate ‘is good’ is what would settle the question as to whether the predicate signifies a property of one or the other kind. I am indebted here to an anonymous referee for this journal.

the intuitive flexibility of values is then vindicated and thereby evaluative realism is rendered unintuitive.¹¹

As I said at the beginning, people quite often claim, nonetheless, that they do not share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions. As I tend to think that they *do* have them after all, the aim of this paper is to offer two considerations in the light of which some might revise what they took to be their own realist supporting intuitions when the proper description of the ETE is concerned. These considerations exploit what I take to be counterintuitive consequences of the realist alternative. If people initially claiming that they do not share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions also find those consequences counterintuitive, that would provide them with reasons for revising what they took to be their own realist supporting intuitions when the proper description of the ETE is concerned.¹² Of course some realist would be ready to bit the bullets, and hence the considerations cannot constitute a refutation of the alternative, realist, approach to values.

3. Internalism vs. Evaluative Realism

John Mackie famously once developed an argument from queerness against there actually being objective goods, where:

An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact of this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. (Mackie 1977, p. 112)

Here he is pointing to what it is sometimes called the *practicality* of the evaluative or *internalism*, roughly: values, whatever they are, have a to-be-pursuedness somehow built into them. That certainly seems something *constitutive* of values as we conceive them. So it is according to Lewis:

If something is a value, and if someone is of the appropriate 'we', and if he is in ideal conditions, then it follows that he will value it. And if he values it, and if he desires as he desire to desire, then he will desire it. And if he desires it, and his desire is not outweighed by other conflicting desires, and if he has instrumental rationality to do what serves his desires according to his beliefs, then he will pursue it. And if the relevant beliefs are near enough true, then he will pursue it as effectively as possible. A conceptual connection between value and motivation. But a multifariously iffy connection. Nothing less iffy would be credible. But still less it is credible that there is no connection at all. (Lewis 1989, p. 72)

I propose to state this internalist claim about values thus:

- (I) It is necessary and *a priori* that: If something is good, we would desire it under appropriate reflective conditions (weakness of will and the like aside).

¹¹ For further details and discussion see López de Sa (2003).

¹² Notice that, for the strategy to be successful, some of those claiming that do not share the flexibility supporting intuitions should find the consequences counterintuitive without being antecedently ready to reject realists views on the matter. And, in my own experience, some *do* so find them. Hence the considerations are not worthless. I am indebt here to an anonymous referee for this journal.

Evaluative realism cannot account for (I). The reason is straightforward: realism entails that the relevant flexible rd biconditional would be at most contingently true. But any counterexample to its necessity is such that the embedded conditional in (I) would be false with respect to it. Hence it would *not* be necessary with respect to the actual world, and hence (I) is false.

Evaluative objectivists, who hold that evaluative properties are fully objective, typically agree and even emphasize this, but then give (I) up and go externalist. They usually claim that that is indeed a virtue of their position, given that the externalist component is independently motivated. Some of them stress what is an undeniable fact: that sometimes people fail to be moved by what is good, even by what they know is good. That would challenge a strengthened version of (I) having it that values *directly* motivate the relevant subjects by directly issuing in them the relevant desire. That would be, I agree, as a matter of fact *not true*, let alone necessarily and *a priori* so: we have already considered cases of weakness of will in which we fail to desire as we value. These by itself would refute the strengthened version of (I). But (I) is suitably weaker, not only on that score, but importantly in requiring that one should value the good *only* under certain, appropriately reflective, conditions. So in order to refute (I) you will need a case of something which is good but such that the appropriate valuers don't desire it at all, *not even* under the appropriate reflective conditions and when their will is strong enough to desire as they desire to desire. But this seems quite a hard thing to have. This case, one is inclined to say with Lewis, is simply not credible.

Someone like David Brink would agree with a lot of this, although he would put it the other way round, as it were:

[T]he internalist cannot rest content with the extensional claim that everyone is in fact motivated [by what is morally good]. Any externalist could claim that. The internalist about motives claims that it is true in virtue of the concept of morality that [moral goodness] necessarily motivate. According to the internalist, then, it must be conceptually impossible for someone to [know that something is morally good] and remain unmoved. This fact raises a problem for internalism: internalism makes the amoralist conceptually impossible. (Brink 1986, pp. 29-30)¹³

The dialectical situation is weird enough, though, for the conceptual impossibility of such an amoralist, who is not at all disposed to desire something that is good, even under appropriate reflective conditions and with a strong enough will, far from raising a problem for internalism is precisely what motivates it. The reason for (I) can be put by the thought that such an amoralist *is* conceptually impossible.

Do we have here an irremovable clash of intuitions? This could be the case, of course. But I take it to be dialectically fruitful enough, for as I said some realists *do* indeed seem to appeal to (I) in rejecting objectivism and to claim instead that evaluative (and moral) properties are, though real, somehow more *subjective* by being essentially tied to (evaluative) responses, in the same way as colors are according to the dispositionalist. But this move is unsuccessful.

¹³ In the original passage, instead of the inserted claims about moral *values* Brink has claims about moral *considerations* and judgments, but I take it that he would certainly, even readily, concur with what I say about the properties and facts. I'll consider internalism concerning judgments in the next section 14.

In his response to Mackie, John McDowell took an “analogue” line of this kind, by arguing that the model for real evaluative properties should not be looked for in the case of primary qualities, as Mackie did, but in the case of *secondary* qualities:

[I]t seems impossible—at least on reflection—to take seriously the idea of something that is like a primary quality in being simple *there*, independently of human sensibility, but is nevertheless (not conditionally on contingencies about human sensibility) such as to elicit some ‘attitude’ or state of will from someone who becomes aware of it. (McDowell 1985, p. 111)

Shifting to a secondary-quality analogy renders irrelevant any worry about how something that is brutally *there* could nevertheless stand in an internal relation to some exercise of human sensibilities. Values are not brutally there—not there independently of our sensibility—any more than colours are: thought, as were colours, this does not stop us supposing that they are there independently of any particular apparent experience of them. (McDowell 1985, p. 120)

I don’t want to go here into McDowell’s specific views concerning values—nor colours, for that matter. Rather, I want to claim that to the extent that one tries to accommodate (I) by claiming that values are real even if not fully objective properties, but rather dispositions to produce certain evaluative response in (rigidly) specified subjects under (rigidly specified) conditions; to that extent the attempt fails. For dispositionalists about value do not deal with (I) any more effectively than objectivists did (as has been also explicitly emphasized with respect to the original Moral Twin Earth by Holland (2001)). And this is so given that the previous remark about the incompatibility of realism and (I) did not appeal to any specific view about the nature of being good besides the assumption that it was a real property and, hence, applies in particular to the relevant, secondary, dispositions.

The dispositionalist about values can of course at this point simply deny that (I) is true, and try to be comforted (say) with the *a priori* component of it, as we have seen evaluative objectivists do. The issue as to whether internalism about values is right or not depends on exactly the same intuitions that would support more directly the reality of the flexibility of values. Hence this is not an independent consideration for settling the issue. But given that, as we have seen, some people mistakenly think that they can accommodate internalism about values within a realist framework, the consideration is worth making, as it is capable of making some revise what they took to be their own realist supporting intuitions.¹⁴

4. *Evaluative Judgment and Motivation*

Internalism in meta-ethics is sometimes intended as a related, though distinct, claim asserting an *a priori* and necessary connection between evaluative (moral) *judgment* and motivation. According to the flexible account of section 2, there is such a connection. Lewis says of it that

it is even iffier that the connection between value itself and motivation; and again I say that if it were less iffier, it would be less credible. If someone believes that something is a value, and if he

¹⁴ I elaborate on the dilemma against McDowell in López de Sa (2006), and he responds in McDowell (2006). I hope to discuss the issue further elsewhere.

has come to this belief by the canonical method [of putting himself in ideal conditions and finding whether he values it], and if he has remained in ideal conditions afterward or else retained the desire to desire that he had when in ideal conditions, then it follows that he values that thing. And if he desires as he desires to desire, then he desires that thing; and so on as before. (Lewis 1989, p. 73)

One could here wonder whether it is really true that were it less iffy, it would be less credible. For the belief one reaches by the canonical method, if it includes *succeeding* in achieving the relevant conditions, would indeed constitute evaluative (moral) *knowledge*. But as it is sometimes stressed, the conceptual connection between evaluative judgment and motivation seems to be independent of whether the judgment is *in fact* true: false beliefs about what is good could motivate just as much as true ones (see for instance Dreier (1990). But the canonical method might not be interpreted as necessarily successful: it is sufficient that one reaches what one *takes to be* the relevant conditions. So we have the following:

If someone believes that something is a value, and if he has come to this belief by the canonical method of putting himself in *what he takes to be* ideal conditions and finding whether he values it, and if he has remained in *what he takes to be* ideal conditions afterward or else retained the desire to desire that he had when in *what he takes to be* ideal conditions, then it follows that he values that thing. And if he desires as he desires to desire, then he desires that thing.

That is so even if he is not right in what he takes to be the relevant conditions, and hence, even if one's belief is in fact not true. Now, to the extent that one *typically* forms one's evaluative judgment by trying to approximate the canonical method, one's judgment typically entails that one is disposed to desire it, under appropriate reflective conditions (weakness of will aside).¹⁵ But even if one typically does it, one need not:

If someone reached the same judgement in some non-canonical way—as he might—that would imply nothing about his valuing or desiring or pursuing. (Lewis 1989, p. 73)

But this, it seems to me, accords pretty well with the common-sense view.

Can the realist account at least for this internalism about evaluative judgement? Brink thinks not. I tend to think he is right, although arguing for such a further incompatibility would involve some complications.¹⁶ In any case, the consideration that I wanted to offer was the previous one.

5. *The Intuitively Properly Missing Evaluative Explanations*

Mark Johnston has recently argued against the view that colors and other manifest properties are *response-dependent*, when a property is response-dependent in his terms iff

¹⁵ If I understand them right, this is close to what is argued in Jackson & Pettit (1995), see also Jackson (1998).

¹⁶ One in my view plausible sufficient condition would be what some philosophers have argued was right in verificationism: for a family of properties like evaluative ones it should be possible to determine sometimes that some of them are instantiated.

it is a flexible property in mine.¹⁷ Abstracting from the details, it runs more or less thus: the idea that some properties are perceptible requires “receptivity”, that there should be causal explanations of the general dispositions of the subjects to elicit the responses under the conditions *in terms of those properties*. But those explanations would go missing if the properties were flexible: satisfying receptivity entails that the relevant flexible rd biconditionals are *contingent*. Hence the label *Missing Explanation Argument* or *MEA* for short.

This provides in my view a further consideration that could make one revise what one took to be one’s own realist intuitions in the evaluative case. According to the *MEA*, if a property is flexible, there will certainly be “deep” causal explanations of the general dispositions of subjects, an explanation that will appeal to certain real properties that unify the relevant instances in the actual world, but those will not appeal to the flexible properties themselves. But it is precisely this that intuitively seems to occur with respect to evaluative properties. Take a soft case. Our general disposition, as we actually are, to be amused by some things in appropriately attentive conditions, as they actually are, will certainly have casual explanations in terms of real properties: perhaps we are actually disposed to be amused by some things *because* they make us expect a connection between ideas that we know are not so connected. But intuitively we would not offer *as a causal explanation* of our dispositions to be amused that things *are funny*. And *mutatis mutandis* for the general case: one should expect there to be a complicated causal explanation of why it is that we are actually disposed to value certain things and not others in the conditions, but intuitively it would not do as a causal explanation *that they are good*.

As before, this consideration again falls short of constituting a full-blooded *argument* against evaluative realism. As an argument it could be seen as presupposing that

¹⁷ His characterization of response-dependence is:

[A] property, Being F, is response-dependent if there is some predicate ‘is F’ which expresses the property (i.e., whose extension across possible worlds is just the things which have the property) such that some substantial way of filling out ‘R’, ‘S’ and ‘C’ makes

x is f if and only if x is disposed to produce x-directed response R in all actual and possible subjects S under conditions C

a priori and necessary; (Johnston 1998, p. 9)

once it is required

that the canonical biconditionals are not merely superficial necessities produced by “rigidifying” on a relation that is itself contingent. The equivalence “x=Neptune if and only if x = the planet in the actual world which causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” is superficially necessary in this way. (Johnston 1998, p. 10)

That the proper target of the argument are response-dependent properties so understood and hence not the views that most people submit under the label of response-dependent accounts of colors — dispositionalist theories of colors — is something I stress in my unpublished ‘The Explanations that are Missed according to the Missing Explanation Argument.’ This, acknowledged by Johnston himself (1998, 37), is rightly emphasized by Haukioja (2000, 109), but apparently has escaped other critics, like López de Sa (2000) and Miller (2001).

the relevant causal explanatoriness of the property in question vis-à-vis the relevant responses is a *necessary* condition for its reality, in the sense I am using the notion. Now, the evaluative realist could complain, one could grant that it would be a sufficient condition, and one could even grant, as occurred in the premises of the MEAs, that concerning colors, or any other kind of *perceptible* property, it *is* a necessary condition. But why should it be in general? In particular, why should it be the case that for evaluative properties to be real they must be causally explanatory vis-à-vis the relevant responses in the way envisaged in which they intuitively aren't? That is, as I understand it, the content of Nagel's complaint (quoted in Sturgeon 1985, p. 235):

it begs the question to assume that *explanatory* necessity is the test of reality in this area. (Nagel 1980, p. 114)¹⁸

Fair enough, I'm inclined to acknowledge. But as with the previous issue concerning internalism, I take it that inasmuch as reflection upon the tension between evaluative realism and internalism about values could make one revise what one took to be realist supporting intuitions concerning the proper intuitive descriptions of the evaluative target situations, reflection upon the present issue about causal explanatoriness could oblige one to make a similar revision. This being so, and even if it falls short of constituting an argument against evaluative realism, I hope the consideration is not devoid of interest.

6. Revisiting Evaluative Explanations

I have just suggested that some evaluative realists explicitly endorse the —counter-intuitive, as I take them to be— consequences of their views: externalism and causal explanatory impotence. The latter may come as something of a surprise, in that some other evaluative realists, notably Nicholas Sturgeon, are usually seen precisely as defending that there *are* moral explanations of the sort that I claim evaluative realists and anti-realists alike acknowledge that intuitively there aren't. In this section I want to defend that this impression concerning Sturgeon does not stand up to a closer analysis, and that his arguments are not incompatible with what I have been claiming so far.

In his classic paper 'Moral Explanations' (1985), Sturgeon aims to rebut a claim he attributes to Harman,¹⁹ according to which "*even if* we assumed the existence of moral facts they would still appear explanatorily irrelevant" (Sturgeon 1985, p. 237), for discussing which, as he observes, he is free to, and does, "*assume*, for the sake of the argument, that there are moral facts" (Sturgeon 1985, p. 237). One could think at this point that that is not a substantive assumption, amounting to something like "there are true simple modal statements." Not so: as he himself makes explicit, his assumption has a much richer content —and, as we are going to see, essentially so— that those moral facts involve moral properties that are, or supervene upon more basic,

¹⁸ As I understand her, something like this is also the view of Judith J. Thomson, see Harman & Thomson (1996), Thomson (1998a) and (1998b).

¹⁹ See footnote 21.

natural properties (Sturgeon 1985, p. 247), so that for anything that has them, “could not have differed in its moral quality without differing in those other [more basic features that makes it have it] as well. (Sturgeon 1985, p. 249).

Let me say a few words on supervenience. There are good (in part a posteriori) reasons for holding that everything supervenes upon the way the world naturally is. How to characterize exactly the content of this rough claim is, of course, by no means easy. But it will be clear that evaluative properties such as the Lewisian, flexible, approach conceives them, *do* clearly supervene on the natural in this sense. (At least, they do so on the assumption that psychological entities, to which evaluative ones flexibly reduce, do.) Furthermore, in the literature there is also a claim sometimes intended as a supervenience claim such that anyone is committed (at any moment) to evaluate similarly things that she judges not to differ naturally. That also holds, again obviously, for flexible response-dependent values. What is *not* true according to the flexible proposal is that evaluative properties supervene *locally* on natural entities, and more in general, on entities which are independent of the relevant valuers. Indeed for any target situation, if its proper description favors a flexible account, then it constitutes a counterexample of the relevant local supervenience claim. And conversely, the relevant realist alternatives could indeed be alternatively characterized by holding the relevant local supervenience claims.²⁰

It is then clear that the content of Sturgeon’s assumption is, in my terms, that moral properties are *real* properties. This is OK for evaluating Sturgeon’s target: that even if moral properties were real properties, they would be explanatorily irrelevant. And his argument is straightforward:

[C]onsider Harman’s own example in which you see the children igniting a cat and react immediately with the thought that it is wrong. Is it true, as Harman claims, that the assumption that the children are really doing something wrong is “totally irrelevant” to any reasonable explanation of your making that judgment? Would you, for example, have reacted in just the same way, with the thought that the action is wrong, even if what they were doing hadn’t been wrong, and could we explain your reaction equally well on that assumption? ... [I]f what they are actually doing is wrong, and *if moral properties are, as many writers have held, supervenient on natural ones*, then in order to imagine them not doing something wrong we are going to have to suppose their action different from the actual one in some of its natural properties as well. So our question becomes: Even if the children have been doing something else, something just different enough *not to be wrong*, would you have taken them even so to be doing something wrong? (Sturgeon 1985, p. 247, my emphasis)

And the answer, I am ready to grant, could be ‘no.’ Suitably generalized, and in our terms: we have granted that there will be deep empirical explanations of our issuing the relevant evaluative responses when confronted with instances of evaluative properties, and our general capacity of so issuing them. If it is *assumed* that the relevant explanatory properties *are* the evaluative properties, then evaluative properties wouldn’t be explanatorily irrelevant. That is something that a defender of the flexibility of val-

²⁰ For further discussion, see López de Sa 2005.

ues could, and I think should, accept.²¹ But that is *not* an “argument to the best explanation” for evaluative realism, though it is sometimes seen in this way.²²

Conclusion

Evaluative realism, I have claimed, should be characterized as denying the flexibility of values. But, I have also claimed, the intuitive description of the relevant counterfactual target situations, like the Evaluative Twin Earth, *does* support flexibility. As some people often claim they disagree with this, I have tried to make explicit some of the consequences of the relevant alternative realist descriptions, in the hope that some will acknowledge their counterintuitive character and revise thereby what they took to be their own realist supporting intuition. According to some evaluative realists, the flexibility supporting intuitions about the proper description of the relevant counterfactual target situations would have their own counterintuitive consequences. To the best of my knowledge, it is usually claimed that flexibility would have unacceptable relativistic consequences with respect to the evaluative domain, for instance being incapable of accounting for the fact that people *disagree* in normal conversations about evaluative issues. I do think that flexibility has relativistic consequences, but I would resist the claim that they are unacceptable. Rather, they are what intuitively seems predictable, in particular when we attend to a presuppositional element, to the effect that participants in conversations are relevantly like the speaker, which is congenial to the flexible proposal.

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²¹ And I don’t know why Sturgeon thinks Harman wouldn’t: Harman has always been explicit acknowledging that “reductivists” would straightforwardly solve the question of the explanatoriness of evaluative properties.

²² If I understand her right, Orlando (2001) reconstructs Sturgeon’s argument this way, and then (rightly) accuses it of begging the question (see Orlando 2001, p. 339). As for her own “abductive argument” for evaluative realism, she also seems to grant that evaluative properties are explanatorily irrelevant *vis-à-vis* the relevant responses, but adds that moral facts could explain other moral facts. Provided that the explanation here is not empirical, this is fully compatible with the flexible account I favor.

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